The 2000s witnessed the third poverty alleviation wave of China. Compared with its predecessors, the third wave distinguished itself by new interventions and redefined standards for the National Poor Counties. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the new program using a data set consisting of 1,411 of China's western and central counties from 2000 to 2010. We combine the propensity score matching method with the difference-in-differences approach, which enables us to avoid selection bias and track the policy impact on variables of interest at each time point. It is found that the non-west local governments were inclined to restrict their economic growth to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed exclusively to the National Poor Counties. It is also shown that the program failed to improve the infrastructure and sanitary conditions in general.
Introduction
The 2000s experienced a new wave of poverty alleviation in China. Compared with its two predecessors, namely the initial wave (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) of China's poverty reduction and the second wave (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , which was also called the 8-7 Plan, the third wave was characterized by a dramatic change in the standard of poverty and the formulation of new policies against rural poverty. The world's largest regional poverty targeting program, which resulted in marvelous economic growth in China, was proved to be a huge success in poverty alleviation in the developing world, leading to a drastic reduction in the population of the poor from about 125 million in 1986, the first year of China's war against rural poverty, to around 32 million in 2000, the final
year of the 8-7 Plan. In the third wave, the number of people living in poverty continued to decrease, to about 26.88 million in 2010. 3 Although the first two waves were viewed as a template in China's war on poverty, there existed two main limitations behind the numerous merits. First, political factors had affected the selection of the National Poor Counties, which was the major intervention in each wave (Park et al., 2002) . As time went by, the targeting program deteriorated, since lobbying efforts and political resistance forced the government not to take National Poor County status away from the initially designated counties, which had already passed the poverty line. Second, the distribution of the poor population also changed over time. At the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy, most of the poverty-stricken rural population mainly lived in contiguous areas.
In 1993, the poverty-stricken population living in the National Poor Counties increased to about 72%, from 50% in 1986, and two-thirds of this population were located in the eastern and central provinces. However, the coverage of the counties shrank to about 60% in 2001, and the poverty level in the eastern provinces greatly decreased due to their soaring economic growth. In response to the newly apparent drawbacks of the old program, the Chinese government made two main changes in the third wave. To avoid political obstacles, the Chinese government adopted a more comprehensive method when selecting new National Poor Counties, which was known as the "631 index" method. Furthermore, to increase the coverage of the rural poor population, along with county-level policies, the Chinese government began to consider including poor villages in the counties. It is also worth noting that since almost all the eastern counties shook off poverty in the first two waves, the Chinese government excluded all the counties in the eastern provinces from the new program in the third wave. This rationalizes our exclusive focus on central and western counties in this study. Table 1 describes the distribution of the poverty-stricken population in the third wave. This paper is closely associated with the previous literature on anti-poverty programs in China, not only in terms of chronological order but also the empirical approach. The previous two poverty reduction waves are studied separately by Park et al. (2002) and Meng (2013) . The former analysis exploits a four-period income growth model, estimates the impact of poverty investments, and uses the propensity score matching method as a robustness check. The main finding is that the National Poor Counties program increased the rural income per capita by 2.28% per year in the first wave. Taking advantage of the policy change in 1994, the latter paper employs a regression discontinuity approach, which uses the propensity score as an instrumental variable to estimate the impact of the second wave. The author finds that the second wave brought about a 38% increase in rural income for the newly designated National Poor Counties. Though the importance of the propensity score was limited in these two papers, the usefulness of the newly introduced method in the non-randomness environment is revealed. Thus, we believe that by combining with various matching methods, the propensity score can play a more important role in the program evaluation. Moreover, the existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of a program on income increment but ignores other changes brought about by the policy.
It is reasonable for us to evaluate sanitary and infrastructure conditions, since China's central government for the first time explicitly included targets to improve health in the program, and reinforced the importance of increasing infrastructure conditions in poor counties.
It has always been a great challenge to estimate the causal effects of a program when a randomized controlled trial is not attainable. However, when public interventions are based on manipulable variables, the causation can be found (Rubin, 1986) . The manipulation may wrongly attribute the effect caused by the pretreatment characteristic difference between the treated and the control cohorts to the assigned treatment, if the two cohorts are unbalanced. Moreover, when we attempt to track the time-varying impact of the program using the difference-in-differences method, the pre-assigned imbalance will cause a further problem. To reduce the selection bias resulted from the problem of imbalance, we adopt the propensity score matching methods to transform the quasi-experimental studies into a randomized experimental approach.
Employing a panel data set consisting of 1,411 central and western Chinese counties over 11 years, we estimate reliable propensity scores by comparing seven differentiated matching methods, and evaluate the impact of the National Poor Counties program in China's third poverty alleviation wave by using the difference-in-differences approach. Our main findings include two parts. First, we identify two possible mechanisms through which the program functioned. Based on our estimation, the program generally has no or negative effects on the whole sample.
However, rather than boosting the economy, non-west local governments preferred to limit their economic growth so as to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed exclusively to the National Poor Counties. Second, we found that the program failed to influence the western and central counties as a whole and achieve its diversified goals, which included the improvement of infrastructure and sanitary conditions. However, for certain subsamples, the program was found not totally in vain.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 comprehensively reviews the history of China's poverty alleviation waves, including the successes achieved in each wave. Section 3 validates and describes the selected variables to estimate the propensity score. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategies. Results are reported in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers the conclusion.
Background

Poverty in China
In China, there is no doubt that poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon (World Bank, 2001; Meng, 2013) . It seems to be an inevitable result of the long existence of the dual economic structure in China's urban and rural areas. For a long time, the Chinese government had exclusively provided urban citizens with various social welfare services, to which rural residents had no access. The rigorous household registration system exacerbated the welfare disparity between households in the urban and rural areas even more. Soon after the reform and opening-up, a difference in incidence of rural poverty began to exist between opulent coastal and less developed inland areas. Since then, China's poverty has switched from a country-wide phenomenon to one that concentrated in the western and central parts. Moreover, residents in revolutionary based areas, minority autonomous areas, and certain remote areas were more prone to poverty than the rest of the rural population.
Three waves of regional poverty alleviation programs have been identified since 1986: the first wave was implemented from 1986 to 1993; the second wave, from 1994 to 2000; and the third wave, from 2001 to 2010. Because of its huge success in poverty reduction, we include the period from 1978 to 1985 as the prior wave as well, even though it lacked any explicit poverty reduction policy. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of the National Poor Counties in each wave. Points shaded in black stand for the National Poor Counties. We can see that as time went by, the government spent more efforts on poverty reduction in inland areas.
The prior wave (1978-1985):
Despite the absence of explicit poverty-targeted programs and coordination at the central government level prior to 1986, Chinese leaders never stopped their pace of the fight against poverty since the reform and opening-up. Given that more than 90 percent of the population living in poverty resided in rural areas, poverty in China was mainly a rural phenomenon. According to a report by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 4 , about 250 million Chinese people, accounting for 30.7% of the total rural population, were identified as poor. Members of this population had an annual income of below 100 Yuan. Then, based on a variety of surveys, three main causes of widespread poverty during this wave were proved to be system-related. The rural land system, which restricted rural productivity due to its lack of incentives, was indicated as the source of rural poverty. In addition, to accumulate funds for industry, the Chinese market system adopted a system of unified purchase and sale, and utilized the scissors gap between the prices of agricultural products and industrial products, which aggravated rural poverty. Meanwhile, as demonstrated by the household registration system, the employment system constrained the flow of the surplus rural labor force, which also exacerbated poverty.
Therefore, to alleviate rural poverty, system changes were needed. In order to enhance the incentives for peasants, the household contract responsibility system replaced the highly collective people's commune system. From then on, rural households began to be independent in cultivating their farmlands. Meanwhile, the subsidized primary product sales (Park et al., 1994) , which aimed to reduce the scissors gap between the prices of agricultural products and industrial ones, were announced. In 1979, the Chinese government increased the prices of ten kinds of agricultural products, including grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops. From 1978 to 1985, the total income induced by the policy was 125.74 billion Yuan, accounting for a 15.5% increase in rural household income. Another policy was to encourage the growth of township enterprises. From 1983, township enterprises began to flourish.
Within three years, the number of township enterprises increased from about 1.34 million in 1983 to 12.22 million in 1985, with the increase in total output value from 101.68 billion Yuan to 272.84 billion Yuan. Respectively, the above three reforms enhanced land productivity, increased agricultural income for farmers, and opened doors for peasants to embark on non-agricultural tasks; in the meantime, the series of policies was implemented to boost the rural economy, relieve rural poverty, and ameliorate the industrial structure.
The achievement of this wave was outstanding. At the end of 1985, the population below the poverty line reduced from 250 million in 1978 to 125 million, with the poverty incidence decreased to 14.8% from 30.7%. Meanwhile, the average annual income increased from 134 Yuan to 397 Yuan. 5
The first wave (1986-1993):
Benefiting from the nationwide economic growth drawn by the institutional reform in the last wave, an overwhelming majority of the rural population, who had suffered in poverty due to the lack of economic opportunities, shook off poverty by taking advantage of their superiority in geography and resources. This uneven development caused the rural poverty to become a regional problem, rather than a national phenomenon as it had been in the past 30 years. The rural poor were mainly distributed in the old revolutionary based regions (lao qu), minority autonomous areas (minzu zizhiqu), and certain inland parts, which basically connected 18 large areas.
Geographically, the 18 areas presented an increasingly concentrated trend from the east to the west.
To address the newly appeared poverty regionality, the Chinese government launched the largest regionally targeted anti-poverty program in the developing world.
In 1986, the State Council set up the Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor Areas (Leading Group hereafter), which was a specialized inter-ministerial anti-poverty institution consisting of all the ministers whose duties were associated with poverty alleviation, to administer and coordinate the new poverty alleviation program. As a major targeting device, the Leading Group enacted the National Poor Counties policy soon after its establishment. For national and political considerations, the Leading Group finally adopted a mixed set of standards to identify the National Poor Counties. The basic poverty line for selecting the National Poor Counties was to have a rural net income per capita of below 150 Yuan in 1985. However, for counties located in old revolutionary base regions or minority autonomous areas, the poverty line was raised to 200 Yuan. The standard was further relaxed to 300 Yuan for counties in very important revolutionary base regions and minority autonomous areas in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Qinghai. 6 According to the above standards, 258 counties were initially designated as the National Poor Counties in 1986. In the following two years, another 70 counties were selected as National Poor Counties as well. By 1988, provinces identified an additional of 370 counties as provincial poor counties, which were supported by the provinces themselves. Compared to the National Poor Counties, the provincial ones usually needed to meet more rigorous standards but received fewer benefits.
The regional targeted poverty alleviation program was proved to be a huge success. The population living in poverty continued to decrease in this period, from 125 million in 1986 to 80 million in 1993. Correspondingly, the poverty incidence dropped from 14.8% following the last wave to 8.7% at the end of 1993. Meanwhile, rural net income per capita in the National Poor Counties increased from 206 Yuan to 484 Yuan. 7
The second wave (1994-2000):
Although the regional targeted program in the first stage covered a sizeable amount of the rural poor, Park et al. (2002) claim that the heavy political compromise during the poor counties selection procedure undermined the program's efficiency.
Certain qualified counties had to give up their eligibility to those politically favored counties which had a rural net income higher than the poverty line (World Bank, 2001 ). In addition, some researchers cast doubt on the validity of the poverty line used to select the National Poor Counties (Meng, 2013) . In response to previous criticisms and the change in geographic distribution of the poor, the Chinese government Since then, 8000 targeted villages had been included in the program. By 2009, the program had received 1.2 billion Yuan from revenue investment, and more than 4 million households had lifted themselves out of poverty because of the program.
The success of this wave was also astonishing. The rural net income reached 5919 Yuan in 2010, about 1.6 times as much as it was in 2000. Table 2 depicts changes in the number of rural poverty-stricken people and the incidence of poverty from 2000 to 2010. Through the steadily increasing poverty line and the Leading Group's adoption of a more extensive standard to identify the poor during the decade, the rural population living in poverty decreased by more than 60% from almost 50 million in the National Poor Counties in 2002 to about 17 million in 2010. Moreover, poverty incidence in the designated counties also decreased sharply after 2002, from 24.3 percent to less than 10 percent in 2010. Considering the successively appearing statistical covariate selection methods, 9 To fulfill the common trend requirement, we include the information of six outcome variables in 1998 and 1999, namely two and three years before the implement of the National Poor Counties program. 10 Local government revenue in China exclusively consists of various tax revenues. While transfer payments are included in the index named local government total revenue. the causal relationships among potential outcomes, treatment assignment, and covariates should initially depend on theoretical bases and previously estimable analyses (Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005) . Since the propensity score matching method only deals with the overt bias, to obtain a precise estimation of the propensity scores and avoid omitted variable bias, variables should not be excluded from our estimation unless the causal relationship fails both theoretically and statistically. In theory, only variables which can simultaneously affect the potential outcomes and treatment assignment should be included in our model. In practice, however, we face a trade-off between bias reduction and variance increment. Moreover, Cuong (2013) demonstrates with Monte Carlo simulations that when estimating the ATTs, more efficiency would be achieved if all the determinants of the outcome variable are included in the matching process. Therefore, besides the variables related to the potential outcomes and the treatment assignment, we also include determinants associated with the outcome variables.
Data
Based on the principles mentioned above, we categorize matching covariates into four categories. Since the program is implemented in 2001, all the matching covariates are lagged one year (in 2000) to avoid the contemporaneous endogeneity.
The first category includes variables that would affect the potential outcomes and treatment assignment simultaneously. They are six variables announced explicitly by the Leading Group to construct the "631 index", including pre-trend GDP per capita, rural households' net income, local revenue per capita, and three dummy indicators of revolutionary based areas, minority autonomous areas, and land frontier counties. In this paper, the first three are also variables of interest. We use GDP per capita to measure the degree of economic growth. There is little doubt that economic growth contributes significantly to poverty alleviation (Ravallion and Datt, 2002; Ravallion and Chen, 2007) , especially in China. As for rural households' net income, it is the most direct assessment of a welfare program and has been widely used to evaluate the previous poverty alleviation waves (Park and Wang, 2010; Meng, 2013) . Finally, to explore the revenue-generating ability of local governments, we measure the local revenue per capita.
The second category consists of another three variables of interest in pre-trend period. As mentioned in the plan of the program, the improvement of infrastructure was one of the main goals. Following Fan et al. (2004) , we use the agricultural machinery power (AMP) per capita to measure the infrastructure condition. Moreover, Loayza and Raddatz (2010) argue that medical care would influence the capacity of poverty reduction programs. Thus, we employ the number of beds in hospitals and sanitation agencies owned by per million people to measure medical care. To support the newly emphasized social welfare aspects, the special transfer payments, which are allocated from higher governments to develop the targeted infrastructure, education and sanitary conditions, will be the main fund resource.
The third category includes the rest covariates in 2000. We use the counties' population density as the counties' basic information. Local government expenditure per capita reflects the magnitude of the governments. Average educational years are chosen to measure the local educational conditions. At last, we exploit the share of first industry and the share of second industry to estimate the counties' industrial structure.
To meet the common trend assumption required by DID estimator, the last category involves outcome variables in 1999 and 1998 for each specific logit regression. We summarize the variables for year 2000 in Table 3 . Before matching, a significant difference exists between the control group and the treated group, except for the dummy of the inland frontier areas. Table 3 shows that the designated counties are generally those with lower economic development and social welfare conditions. They are as well more agricultural prone counties. It suggests that one might attribute the effects due to the pretreatment imbalance to the National Poor Counties program.
Therefore, we need a certain remedy to rebalance the data, rather than performing a simple comparison.
Methodology
Since the pretreatment data set is unbalanced, we have to find certain methods to remove the potential selection bias. In this paper, we utilize the propensity score matching method to balance the two groups. Rather than arbitrarily using one matching method, we perform various methods and then compare their extent of bias reduction.
Propensity score estimation
Propensity score is a predicted probability of a unit to get treated, usually obtained from a logistic regression. Combined with matching methods, it enables us to transform multi-dimensional matching into one-dimensional matching, which increases the matching efficiency dramatically. We can also remove the overt bias with the propensity score matching process. Second, compared with regular linear regression methods, we do not need a valid instrumental variable and can make use of the logistic function as follows:
where W stands for the binary treatment status of observation i (W = 1, if unit i is treated; W = 0, otherwise), X is a vector of conditional variables, and β is the coefficient of X .
In practice, we usually make the logarithmic transformation after the estimation.
Since the logistic regression may underestimate the probability of rare events (Tomz et al., 2003) , the rule of thumb is to choose a control group data set no more than nine times as large as the treatment group (Baser, 2006) . In our sample, the control data set and treatment group ratio is about 2:1. Therefore, it is proper to apply logistic regression in our model.
Matching algorithms
In this part, we introduce the three most commonly used matching methods, from which our seven methods extend. The purpose of applying matching algorithms is to balance between the control group and the treated group. Due to the lack of randomly assigned treatments, the control units and the treated ones are usually unbalanced before the treatment. Hence, different outcomes may be attributed to those pretreatment imbalances rather than the treatment effects. The matching algorithm with the highest quality is the one that can eliminate the difference between the treated and the control groups in the data set we analyzed.
Let I and I stand for sets of counties in the treated group and control group respectively, S the region of common support, and then the ATT for the National Poor Counties program is defined as follows: 
where n denotes the number of units in the set of I ∩S , and W(i, j) is the matching weights, which will be allocated to those control counties to further form a reliable counterfactual. Depending on the choice of the function form of W(i, j), a variety of matching methods have been proposed, that is nearest-neighbor matching, radius matching, and kernel matching.
Nearest neighbor matching (NNM) compares the distance in terms of propensity score between non-participants and a participant, the closest one in the control group is chosen to be a matching partner for the treated individual (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . Radius matching (RM) is a method combining NNM with a caliper, which is a sort of tolerance level associated with the maximum distance in terms of propensity score. While, as a non-parametric matching algorithm, in kernel matching (KM), treated members are matched with a weighted average of a subgroup of control members depending on the bandwidth we choose. In addition, based on NNM, the first variant is called NNM without replacement, which means that individuals in the control group can be chosen as a matching partner no more than once. The second variation is n-to-1 NNM. The main difference between this variant and NNM is that we can use the closest n control individuals in distance as matching partners for a treated individual.
To further eliminate unobservables that may affect the National Poor Counties' assignment and the outcome variable, drawn on the panel data, we adopt the difference-in-difference matching strategy (Heckman et al., 1997; Gebel and Voßemer, 2014) . Rather than directly focusing on the outcome variable, this variation matches on the before-and-after-treatment differences in the outcome between the treated and the matched controls. In this way, besides the overt bias, we are able to further eliminate the constant hidden differences and additive selection bias, and thereby significantly improve the quality of our estimation results. The difference-in-difference propensity score matching (PSM-DID) estimator is defined in the following way:
where Y (Y ) and Y (Y ) are the outcome variables of interest for the treated (control) counties in time t and t', that is before and after the implementation of the National Poor Counties program.
Results
Propensity score estimation results
In this paper, we have six variables of interest, each of which has distinct determinants. Consequently, we apply logistic regression six times separately for those outcome variables. As displayed in Table 4 , most of the covariates included in the logistic regression are significant and exhibit reasonable signs as expected.
Basically, no matter what outcome variables we choose, the GDP per capita, rural households' net income, the local government expenditure, and sanitation conditions are negatively related to the probability of a county being chosen as a National Poor
County. However, a county that is identified as a revolutionary based county and with a higher share of second industry and special transfer payment per capita is more likely to be selected as a National Poor County. Given six pseudo-R2 are all above 0.500, our equations explain more than 50% of the variation in the choice.
Moreover, to see the goodness of fit of our regression, we calculate the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The greater the predictive power of our estimation, the more bowed the ROC curve, hence the larger the area created under the curve. Therefore, the area under the curve (C-statistics) can be used to measure the predictive power of our logistic regression. To achieve a valid classification, the C-statistic should be greater than 0.80, which is met in our case that is shown in Figure 2 .
Matching results
Since bad quality matching with small bias reduction and therefore imbalance between the treated and the control groups could lead to biased estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated, to find out the most suitable type of matching, we implement five matching algorithms, including nearest neighbor matching, nearest neighbor matching without replacement, 3-to-1 nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, and kernel matching. Since a caliper can significantly improve the matching quality, according to the rule of thumb, we impose 0.25*SD (standard deviation) calipers on each matching algorithm. By doing so, we rely on the fact that the performance of different matching methods varies case by case mainly according to the data set we use.
As exhibited in Table 5 , we test the group balance before and after matching based on three criteria. 11 Firstly, we apply a t-test to calculate the t-statistics for the treated group and the control group after matching. Except for NNM without replacement, the other four algorithms perform equally badly, leaving around ten unbalanced variables between the participant and nonparticipant counties. As for the NNM without replacement, it induces no significant difference between two cohorts (all the p-values are greater than 0.100).
Secondly, we check the standardized percentage bias, which is the percentage difference of the sample means in the treatment and matching subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the variances in the treated and the control cohorts (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) . Even without an explicit standard under which we can treat a standardized percentage bias as a success, 5%, 8% and 20% are commonly used as the sufficient threshold (Girma and Görg, 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) . It is clear that the performance of NNM without replacement is also the best under this criterion. Figure 3 depicts the standardized percentage bias across covariates after NNM without replacement.
Lastly, we calculate the percentage bias reduction in the means of the independent variables after and before matching. The results are almost the same as those we obtain from the previous two criteria. As for the NNM without replacement, the percentage bias reductions of all the explanatory variables are more than 70.0% except for the land frontier, which are much higher than the results of other algorithms.
Therefore, taking the three criteria into consideration, the best matching type for our data set is the NNM without replacement. In addition, we perform the sensitivity analysis by changing the caliper to more rigid ones, and the results vary little. Hence, we stick to NNM with 0.25*SD calipers for the following analysis.
Impact of the third wave
Although the National Poor Counties program was designed to promote economic growth and enrich the poor, the designated counties might well deviate from the original intention for their own interests. There were a couple of distinct potential responses of local governments to the beneficial program, leading to two opposite mechanisms by which the program functioned. Since economic growth would increase a local government's revenue by expanding the tax base, a local government has an incentive to develop the economy, which in turn benefits itself. It turns out to be a virtuous circle. Meanwhile, economic growth is supposed to enrich the poor through trickle-down effects. In the case of China, the National Poor
Counties exclusively received various transfer payments from both central and provincial governments and enjoyed preferential policies implemented by them;
however, all these would be cancelled if a county became so developed that it passed the poverty line. Therefore, there existed two ways of development for local governments. First, taking advantage of the various benefits brought by the program, they could spare more effort on local development to pass the poverty line and continue their economic and welfare growth without the previous transfer payments and preferential policies. Second, being afraid of losing the previous financial and political support and even slipping into retrogression, the designated counties might attempt to maintain their benefits from their National Poor County identities by lowering their growth rate to avoid passing the poverty line.
Also, as mentioned in sections 2 and 3, the third wave was more ambitious than its predecessors in that besides regional economic growth and rural households' income growth as the main goals of the first two waves, the explicit target of the third poverty alleviation wave consisted of three parts, namely infrastructure promotion, educational and sanitary conditions improvement. Since the first wave, the three main interventions had reflected that the promotion of infrastructure was ranked as the first priority in poverty alleviation attempts. Moreover, the third wave for the first time explicitly included the improvement of health and education as a poverty alleviation measure. However, whether these goals have been achieved remains unknown.
Therefore, in this subsection, we attempt to answer two questions. First, what was the main local governments' response to the program? Second, were those poverty alleviation goals achieved?
What was the main response of local governments to the program?
If the first mechanism functions, we would expect significantly positive coefficients for GDP and revenue in per capita form. However, if the second mechanism dominates, we would observe negative coefficients for GDP per capita at the end years of the program, which capture the attempts of local governments to limit their economic growth to maintain their identities in the next wave. We would as well expect significantly negative coefficients for revenue per capita, given the lower economic growth and consequently the shrunk tax base. In addition, since we assume that local governments are inclined to sacrifice GDP growth rate for higher transfer payments, some significantly positive coefficients for special transfer payment per capita are expected.
As shown in the first column from Table 6 to Table 9 , DID estimators reflect the ineffectiveness of the National Poor Counties program for the whole sample. GDP growth rates in Table 6 are significantly negative at the beginning of the program, and turn to insignificant since 2004. The local government revenue in Table 8 almost follows the same pattern. Table 7 reveals that the income disparity between participant and nonparticipant counties is larger after the implementation of the program. We provide two possible explanations for the results. First, since local governments were inclined to limit their economic growth, the trickle-down effect that would benefit the poor as the economy boomed collapsed. Second, after China's 20-year effort against poverty, the remaining poor residing in the most remote areas were still unable to share the benefits brought by national economic growth or the regional targeted poverty alleviation program. Thus, it was difficult to lift that part of the poor population out of poverty. In response to the bad economic performance, the central government allocates more transfer payments to support the designated counties since 2006, as the estimates become positively significant in Table 9 .
From the estimation for the whole sample, we know little about the mechanism of the program except for the ineffectiveness. We therefore separate the sample to analyze the heterogeneity of subsamples, in order to identify which mechanism functions. We first identify the counties involved in the "Western Development
Strategy" launched out in 2000 as the west counties; the rest as the non-west counties.
The second column from Table 6 to Table 9 reveals a basically same pattern of the west counties as the whole sample. However, the special transfer payments received by west counties are insignificant in the sampled period. As for the non-west counties, the second mechanism functions. In the third column of Table 6 , the GDP growth rate turns significantly negative since 2008 (-13.4% in 2008, -13.4% in 2009, and -17.9% in 2010), which means that for certain reasons the program hampered the economic growth of the non-west counties. It reflects that at the end of the third wave, the designated counties were worried about re-selection in the next wave and tried to limit their growth rate to maintain their identity in the following program. In addition, the coefficients of special transfer payment per capita are significantly positive in the most years, which reflect that the non-west counties are more likely to get access to the special transfer payments after the implementation of the program. The aforementioned features demonstrate that the second mechanism was the main mechanism through which the National Poor Counties program affected local governments.
We further analyze the heterogeneity for counties located in flat areas and mountainous areas. The fourth and fifth columns from Table 6 to Table 9 show the results. While the program has different effect on the two types of counties from the whole sample, we find almost no difference between the two types. In 2000s, the program generally has the negative effect on those counties in terms of GDP growth, income level, and local government revenue. Unfortunately, however, those counties do not obtain substantial transfer payments to compensate their lower economic development.
Were those poverty alleviation goals achieved?
Restricted by the limited data, in the paper, we are only able to detect the impact of program on the infrastructure conditions and sanitary conditions. In general, Table   10 shows that the program has insignificant impact on the sanitary conditions at the beginning and end of 2000s, and significantly negative impact in the middle period. This is because after the special transfer payments increase since 2005, the negative effect on the sanitary conditions fades. The west counties and mountainous counties almost follow the same scenario with the whole sample. However, the program has no effect on the non-west counties in terms of sanitary conditions, for their all insignificant coefficients in the sample period. As for flat areas, there is a positive effect soon after the implementation of the National Poor Counties program (104.537, significant in 2001), though it lasts for only year.
As mentioned in section 3, we exploit the agricultural machinery power per capita to investigate the rural infrastructure level. In the first column of Table 11 , the insignificant coefficients of the whole sample reveal that the attempt of the program to improve infrastructure was in vain. Following the same decomposition method as before, we find that the results of the subsamples of west, non-west, and flat counties coincide with those of the whole sample. As for mountainous areas, the program basically has no effect except for 2008, where the agricultural machinery power per capita decreases by 9.5%, which is significant at the 5% confidence level. Combining with results with respect to the special transfer payments in Table 9 , we find that although the transfer payments increase for the whole sample and non-west counties in certain years, it fails to improve the infrastructure and sanitary conditions in designated counties. Thus, the social welfare goals of the program fail to be achieved.
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the National Poor Counties program on those newly designated counties. To eliminate the overt bias to the largest extent, we compare five differentiated types of propensity score matching algorithms and find that the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) method is most suitable for our data set.
We then combine NNM with the DID estimator to further control for the constant hidden differences and additive selection bias. We have two main findings. First, we distinguish two potential responses of local governments to the program. Based on our results, non-west local governments were inclined to limit their economic growth so as to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed exclusively to the designated counties. Second, we find that the targeted program had a negative effect on infrastructure in some years and failed to affect sanitary conditions in general.
However, if we further decompose the whole sample into various types of counties, the National Poor Counties program would have different impacts on different subsamples. Our results show that the program was not totally in vain as it still worked in certain counties. Tables   Table 1 The distribution of poverty population in 2000, 2005 and 2010 Year 2000 Table 2 The rural poverty population and the incidence of poverty are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 0.145** 0.067 0.121* 0.095 0.174 (0.065) (0.101) (0.071) (0.102) (0.123) Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 0.029 0.029 -0.045 -0.016 0.014 (0.053) (0.086) (0.054) (0.090) (0.095) Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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